Being-in as such

Introduction

This short paper will try to find the genesis and follow the transformation of the existential-ontological concept of 'being-in as such' in Martin Heidegger's early philosophical work, including the concept's mature articulation in *Sein und Zeit*. It will highlight sources and first appearings of co-original phenomena connected with being-in. The developing structuration of their equiprimordial relations is also thematized, taking the structure as laid out in *Sein und Zeit* for its standard. (See below and appendix)

Dasein's fundamental structures

Time
(ultimate structure)

Care
(comprehensive structure)

Being-in-the-world
(preliminary structure)

Equiprimordial constituents [1]	1. **Worldhood**			
	2. **Who of Dasein**			
	3. **Being-in** (central structure)			
	Equiprimordial characteristics	1.**Disposedness**	Fallen/founded modes	**Fear**
		2. **Understanding**		1. **Interpretation** 2. **Assertion** 3. **Curiosity** 4. **Ambiguity** 5. **Knowing**
		3.**Discourse**		**Idle talk**

[1] TK-1: Compare with Husserl's thought on part-whole relations, with the difference between dependent moments and independent pieces (Stücke) of a whole.

Chronological ordering of texts:

I.   *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* (Book by Adolf Deissmann)
II.   *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (course, 1919-1920)
III.   *Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (course, 1923)
IV.   "The Concept of Time" (lecture, July 1924)
V.   *Ground Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (course, 1924)
VI.   "The Concept of Time" (projected article, November 1924)
VII.   *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (course, 1925)
VIII.   *Being and Time* (book, 1927)

Summaries of relevant texts

I.   *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* by Adolf Deissmann

  In *Paul* the author contemplates the problematic of the interpretation of the experience of 'Christ in me, I *in* Christ.' Heidegger read this study during WWI and it was one of the **preliminary sources** for the problematic of the meaning of **'to be in.'**

  Deissmann makes the point that the correct understanding of Paul is when he is seen as a mystic, who experienced the immanence of Christ (139) much more than his transcendence (137). Paul was predisposed towards such an understanding and experience because of a Hellenistic-mystical tendency within his background (138). Paul's Christianity was a Christ-mysticism (147) and Deissmann understands mysticism to be that "religious tendency that discovers the way to God **direct** through **inner** experience **without the mediation** of reasoning." (149)

  In Paul's experience Christ was more of the nature of **Spirit** than a historical **person**. Spirit for Paul is something akin to a non-earthly *pneuma*, to which Paul applied the predicates of "divine, heavenly, eternal, holy, living, and live-giving." (143) As air is *in* us and we *in* air, we can be *in* the Christ-Spirit and the Christ-Spirit *in* us. The formula 'in Christ' can also be expressed as 'of Christ' in which the genitive is neither subjective nor objective, but **mystical**. Deissmann makes clear that this mystical experience is one of *communio* and not of *unio*, i.e. our personhood does not dissolve in *union* with Christ, but we come to an intimate *communion* or **fellowship** with Him, and through Him with God. (151-152) Deissmann assumes that this Christ-intimacy (*Christ-Innigkeit* [135]) of Paul would have its differing degrees of elevation (142). (This would be quite impossible in *unio*-mysticism where there are no gradations, where it is the case of an all-or-nothing.)

  The **relevance** of Deissmann's contemplation on Paul's *Christ-Innigkeit* (135) for an understanding of Heidegger's formally indicated *Inheit* lies in certain structural congruencies. These congruencies would be between "the *structure* of the subject in mysticism" (GBT 82, quoting Heidegger) and "the phenomenological structure of immediate experience" (GBT 81), with the former helping Heidegger radicalizing the latter. As Christ can only be experienced through a **non-theoretical, unmediated, inner experience** of *communio* (151), Dasein's basic state of Being-in-the-world can also only be understood through a **similar** non-theoretical, unmediated, inner experience of *communio* of Dasein with its own Being. In such experience Dasein understands its own Being as both in-the-world and having itself as such. Dasein does not lose its 'own-ness' *in unio* in the 'there' of its world, as would happen in *unio*-mysticism ("I am he and He is I") or certain enthusiastic or chaotic states of mind, but retains its own sense of self in the 'there' of its Dasein. [2] Dasein can have/be this experience in differing degrees of clarity and structuration, and as it is an understanding experience, Dasein can interpret it and bring it to expression in differing degrees of adequacy. This **element** of *communio*-mysticism in understanding Heidegger is a necessary ingredient in the pre-theoretical philosophical experiences of Dasein's self-understanding, including **Being-in as such**. These experiences are of Dasein's own meaningful contextual structures, suggested in the most subtle and under-determined way by Heidegger's formal indications.

---

[2] TK-1: "But self is not already had, but is *attained in* the happening of be-ing, ex-sistentially; i.e. gains its own-ness *in the event* of en-ownment."

II.   *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (WS 1919-1920)

In this course one can find a **precursor** to BT's equiprimordial hows of **'being in'** (disposition-understanding-discourse) in the formally indicative triad of 'lived experience-understanding-expression' (Dilthey), which Heidegger uses both in critiquing contemporary psychology and in **developing a terminology** for his "pretheoretical science of the original domain of the self-world." (GBT 121) [3]

III.   *Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (OHF, SS 1923)

The relevance of this course is the fact that here for the very **first** time the question is asked about the meaning of 'in' (65) as one of the equiprimordial constituents of the distributive concept **Being-in-a-world**, which term is also used here for the **first** time (79). For a right understanding of Dasein's being-in Heidegger starts making some **first contrasts** between the mode of **being-in belonging to Dasein** and **being-in belonging to worldly entities** (79). The formal indication Being-in-a-world expresses the way (Heidegger's) Dasein has placed itself in a **'forehaving'** for this investigation into Dasein's own structures, which for the time being is **sufficiently primordial** and genuine (62), though an even **more primordial** forehaving is operative, which is **care** (79). Important here too is that Dasein as care, as the authentic mode of Being-in-the-world, has a **pre-reflexive structure** of both **caring** for its **'there'** and, in this 'there,' for **itself**. (79)

IV.   "The Concept of Time" (lecture, July 1924)

The major issues in this lecture are **time**, **temporality** and one's own **death** within the context of Dasein's ownness in its particular while. The topic of *Being-in as such* is **not** treated here, but is here presented in a "still quite **nascent** phase" of some first "quite imperfect steps" towards explicating Being-in in terms of its three **equiprimordial** characteristics of **disposition**, **understanding** and **discourse**. (GBT 317)

The relevance of this course is that 8 equiprimordial characteristics of Dasein are presented here. These 8 indicated "fundamental structures" of Dasein are:

1.   **Being-in-the-world**
2.   Being-with
3.   **Discourse**
4.   Dasein as mine in each particular while
5.   Everydayness
6.   Dasein's concern for its own be-ing
7.   **Disposedness**
8.   Modes of Dasein's having itself (12-13)

They are not yet thematized in their mutual relations in structural groupings.

The relevant examples for the thematic of in-being are:

1.   **Being-in-the-world**: "Da-sein is that entity which is characterized as *being-in-the-world*. Human life is not some subject that has to perform a trick to **enter** the world." Dasein is already **in**-volved in its world in myriad ways of being concerned. (KK 214/CT 12)
2.   **Discourse**: "The fundamental way of the Dasein of the world is *speaking*. … It is predominantly in **speaking** that human being-in-the-world plays itself out and runs its course." (KK 214/CT 12)
3.   **Disposition** is italicized in the 7th of the indicated "fundamental structures": "The averageness of everyday Da-sein does not imply a reflection upon the ego or the self, and nevertheless Dasein has itself. It *finds* itself with itself, intimately *disposed* to itself. It comes across itself there in that with which it commonly has to do." (KK 215/CT 13)

---

[3] TK-1: This is a "Self that is found and achieved _in_ its world."

V.   *Ground Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (SS 1924)

In this course Heidegger deals with the "Ground Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy." Of the 30 ground concepts listed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics*, four of them (**habit**, **passion**, **having**, **disposition**) will find a fundamentally **correlated** role in BT. **'Disposition**,' having a central role, becomes the very **first** mode of **'being-in**.' Heidegger translates the Greek term as *Befindlichkeit*, which indicates not only a situation, but also refers to "*how* one finds [has] oneself situated, positioned, **disposed**." According to Heidegger Aristotle already was aware of the close connection between 'having' and 'being in.' (GBT 293)

VI.   "The Concept of Time" (projected article, November 1924)

        The second section of the article, titled *The original Characteristics of the Being of Dasein*" (GBT 326-338), brings some **structural organization** to the 8 'basic structures' of the July lecture. This is done by repeating the "tripartite outline of questions" as posed in SS 1923 (OHF 65) regarding Dasein in its basic state of Being-in-the-world (GBT 326). It also makes the point that to analyze Dasein we have to first look at human life at its most **daily** level. We are bound to analyze Dasein in its **everydayness**, because this is what it means, 'first of all,' "to *be in* the *world*." (327)

        The very **first** elaboration of **in-being** (*In-Sein*) focuses, not on 'understanding,' but its derivative 'interpretation,' which is preserved in 'idle talk' (discourse). 'Idle talk' can be both a **positive** phenomenon, that it **preserves** 'interpretation,' but also **negative**, that it can **harden** into "*having been* interpreted." (334) 'Interpretation' as a way of **in-being** is central because it will lead to **'care**,' which is Dasein's original constitution. (335) Here **'Care'** is discussed in its immediate mode of the **'in'** of **in**-terest and **in**-volvement with the world, characterized by intimate familiarity, feeling at home, unthreatened in its dwelling (Grimm's *innan* makes here its **first** appearance), knowing one's way around, trust in and reliance upon the world. (335)

        First use of the formal indication for Dasein's "ontological commerce with itself": Dasein is an entity which in its *in-being* goes about this very being." This "going about its own being" of Dasein is more basic than its "going about the world" (335) These are the two aspects of the 'there' of *in-being* brought out in disposedness: 1) it *is* its there; "Dasein *finds itself* there" and 2) it lets the world be **encountered.**

        In section III (*Dasein and Temporality*) **in-being** is connected with temporality. Dasein is not *in* time, but it *is* time. "Dasein *is* time itself." (341).

        From the beginning of section IV (*Temporality and Historicality*) Kisiel surmises a more methodological explanation for Heidegger's use of "seemingly exaggerated one-liners" like *being-in*, *being-with* etc. and statements of identity like "Dasein *is* time, *is* history, *is* its generation," etc. What gives **structural coherence** to the phenomena drawn from Dasein's facticity is a *"'logic' of equiprimordiality."* (GBT 348) Out of the tripartite **equiprimordial** characteristics of **in-being** (disposition-understanding-discourse) the **co-original** phenomena of Dasein's **temporality** and **historicality** can become visible. Heidegger expresses this in the phenomenological proposition "**Dasein is history**. In-*being* itself as *being*-temporal *is* historical." (GBT 349) And "Dasein *is* its 'generation,'" that is, Dasein identifies with and lives out of its particular generational 'interpretedness' of its in-being and world. (GBT 350)

VII.   *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (SS 1925)

"In SS 1925, pains are taken to **distinguish** in-being [*In-Sein*] from being-in (*Sein-in*) to <u>eradicate every vestige of spatial containment</u> from the former notion. Rather than a **being 'in' something**, in-being is **a 'way to be,'** that of intimate involvement in habitative dwelling" i.e. *in*-habiting a world. (GBT 500) In § 19 (*The basic constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The in-being of Dasein and the being-in of things on hand*) Heidegger reiterates that:

1.   "Dasein is to show itself as *being-in-the-world*"
2.   this is a "*unified* and *original*" determination
3.   three individual structural moments, of which "***in-being as such***" is one, can be brought out, though the others and the whole itself are **co-intended**. (157)

At first glance we complete **in-being** by 'in-the-world,' but are then inclined to see this in-being with the character of being-in, i.e. the relationship of something 'in' something or spatial containment. Entities 'in' space with the same kind of being, that of **being on hand**, do not have the characteristic of in-being. (157) "… 'in' primarily does not signify anything spatial at all but means primarily *being familiar with*." (158) "<u>Dasein … is in the way of being of **in-being**</u>." It's not a property, without which it could as well be. "<u>In-being is *the* constitution of the Being of Dasein</u>." Wherever Dasein was examined the structure of **in-being** was always already seen. If it had been **totally overlooked** it could **not** have been **understood** in the first place.

§ 20 (*Knowing as a derivative mode of the in-being of Dasein*) is one of the exemplary sections in which Heidegger makes the "leap" from Husserl's "oriented consciousness" to his own "situated being-in-the-world" by "setting intentionality back into the more comprehensive context of care." (Intro to HCT 49 in Kisiel's HWT) "… Intentionality--the bare and isolated directing-itself towards--must still be set back into the unified structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in." (303-304)

In § 27 (*In-being and care--an outline*) Heidegger makes a strong case for the **centrality** of *in-being as such*. "… <u>the being of Dasein is to be defined **ultimately** from *in-being as such*</u>," because the analytic of Dasein refers in **any** of its special explications (worldhood, the 'who,' Anyone, etc.) to a **kind** of being-in-the-world, in the sense of a **way to be**. Only the **correct** understanding of **in-being** can guarantee the "**founding** of the remaining co-original structures" (251). Therefore the interjection of a "**provisional** characterization" of *in-being as such* at the beginning of the analysis (§ 19) by **contrasting** Dasein's in-being and worldly being-in (159). At this point Heidegger can state more clearly that the being of Dasein is **not:**

1.   "of the mode of the being of the world" as either **being-handy** or **being-on-hand**
2.   "the being of a **'subject'**"
3.   "the being of the ***'between'*** subject and world"
4.   "a **microcosm** over against the world as a macrocosm." (251-252)

A further uncovering and specification of the phenomenon of *in-being* is by way of "advancing to <u>the structure of Dasein</u>," which is *care*. From this phenomenon will come the "comprehensive terminology for the determinations of the constitution of Dasein." This investigation of *in-being* will be done in four parts:

1.   "The phenomenon of ***discoveredness***" (which includes the phenomena of **disposition**, **understanding**, **interpretation**, **discourse**, language)
2.   "***falling*** as a basic movement of Dasein" (highlighted in **idle talk**, **curiosity**, **ambiguity**)
3.   "the structure of ***uncanniness***" (flight, **fear**, dread, uncanniness)
4.   *care*.

These phenomena are treated in §§ 28-31. In § 28 (*The phenomenon of discoveredness*) Heidegger for the **first** time gives a **thematic** treatment of <u>the equiprimordiality of Dasein's having itself and its world</u> in self-finding and understanding (GBT 378). "The co-discoveredness of in-being itself, that I am to my Dasein itself first in a worldly way, that is, that *I have myself in a self-worldly way* as an accompaniment in my concerned absorption in the world: this is not a consequence of the disclosedness of the world, but is equiprimordial with it." (HCT 254 & GBT 378, Kisiel's emphasis)

VIII.   *Sein und Zeit* (1927)

As it was in HCT, 'Being-in as such' is presented in SZ (53) as one of the "**several constitutive items**" of the **unitary** phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, which by itself is the necessary *a priori* state of Dasein. This phenomenal datum may "be looked at in three ways" (worldhood, 'who,' inhood) though we should "keep the whole phenomenon [of Being-in-the-world] firmly in mind." The three aspects may be "brought out for emphasis," while bringing the others along with it. Before analyzing these three aspects in detail (§§ 29-38) Heidegger "provided an **advance orientation**" of 'Being-in as such,' (§ 12) and also **illustrated** it in the "founded mode" of "**knowing the world**." (§ 13)

In § 12 (*A preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world, in terms on an Orientation towards Being-in as such)* Heidegger **reiterates** many of the points**--**though some are more **elaborated--**already presented in HCT like:
1.   the contrast between **spatial relationships** and Dasein's *being-in*
2.   **derivation** of the prepositional 'in' from the verb '*innan*'
3.   Dasein's own *'existential spatiality'*
4.   **concern** as a characteristic of the many ways of *being-in*
5.   *Being-in* as **essentially** belonging to Dasein
6.   the **non-accidental** use of **negative** characterizations of *Being-in*
7.   the problematic conceiving of the **soul as present-at-hand**

After the concrete analysis of worldhood (§§ 14-24) and the 'who' (§§ 25-27) a more penetrating Interpretation of the phenomenon of **Being-in** is attempted in § 28 (*The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in*). This analysis will provide a better understanding of the "structural totality of Being-in-the-world," and also pave the way for understanding Dasein as **care**. Again, many of the analyses were started already in HCT and earlier works. The main points made are:

1)   **The logic of equiprimordiality**. The primordiality of Being-in cannot be nullified by a misplaced tendency towards deriving all phenomena from "some simple 'primal ground'." One should not overlook the possibility of the equiprimordiality of multiple constitutive characteristics of Being. (131)

2)   **Overcoming the tradition**. Again, one can characterize Being-in with some 'negatives' by stating that being-in is **not** 1) the **insideness** of two entities present-at-hand, 2) a characteristic of a **present-at-hand** subject, or 3) the **'commercium'** or **'between'** a subject and object. All these **inadequate** characterizations have in common that they **assume** that the **how** of the **connection** is one between two things that are **present-at-hand**. This "always *splits* the phenomenon asunder." Decisive here is to **prevent** the splitting of the phenomenon. Therefore there is a need for a more detailed study to **overcome the tendency** to treat the problem in a traditional way, which way seems "ontically self-evident," but is ontologically speaking a **cover-up** and even loses sight of the phenomenon. (132)

3)   **Dasein's disclosedness**. "Being-in is … an essential kind of Being of this entity itself" and "Being-in-the-world *is* itself in every case its **'there'**." The **'there'** implies a here of a **Being 'I-here'** and its open **relation to a 'yonder**,' as Being directed concernfully towards a 'yonder,' that is disclosed and ready-at-hand. Because Dasein has this essential character of disclosedness it is, together with the Being-there of world, also 'there' for itself. In short Dasein "*is* in such way as to be its 'there'." (SZ 133) "*Dasein is its disclosedness*" and always brings its 'there' along with it. As Dasein is an entity for whom its own Being is an issue for itself, and as its own Being is its 'there,' Dasein's 'there' is its proper issue. The explication of **Being-in as such** is the explication of the Being of the 'there.' (132)

4)   **Equiprimordial characteristics of Being-in as such.** There are two **equiprimordial** constitutive ways for Dasein to be its there, and those are *understanding* (*Verstehen*) and *state-of-mind* (*Befindlichkeit*), both of which are characterized by *discourse* (*Rede*). These will be clarified by some concrete phenomenal modes belonging to them like **fear** as a **state-of-mind** (**disposedness**); **interpretation, assertion, curiosity, ambiguity** as modes of **understanding**; and **idle talk** as a mode of **discourse**. In these analyses the movement of **'falling'** will become visible as a basic kind of Being of the 'there.' (133)

Dasein's fundamental structures
and their appearance in Heidegger's works

Dasein's fundamental Structures		OHF ('23) [i]	CT-1 ('24) [ii]	CT-2 ('24) [iii]	HCT ('25) [iv]	BT ('27) [v]
I. Being-in-the-world		62	12	326-338	III (§§ 18-26)	II (§§ 12-13)
Equiprimordial constituents	1. **Worldhood**	62		327-332	§§ 21-25	III (§§ 14-24)
	2. **Who of Dasein**	62		332-334	§ 26	IV (§§ 25-27)
	3. **Being-in**	62		334-338	§ 19 & IV	§ 12 & V (§§ 28-38)
3.1. Knowing as founded mode of Being-in				337	§ 20	§ 13
II. Being-in as such		66 & 79		334-338	IV (§§ 27-30)[vi]	V (§§ 28-38)
Equiprimordial characteristics	1. **Disposedness**		13	335	§ 28 a)	§ 29
	2. **Understanding**				§ 28 b)	§ 31
	3. **Discourse**		12	334	§ 28 d)	§ 34
1.1. Fear as founded mode of disposedness				336	§ 30	§ 30
2.1. Interpretation as founded mode of understanding				334	§ 28 c)	§ 32
2.2. Assertion as founded mode of understanding						§ 33
2.3. Curiosity as fallen mode of understanding		49-50, 80		337	§ 29 b)	§ 36
2.4. Ambiguity as fallen mode of interpretation					§ 29 c)	§ 37
3.1. Idle talk as fallen mode of discourse		25-26		334	§ 29 a)	§ 35
4. Falling and **thrownness**				335	§ 29 d) & e)	§ 38
III. Care		79-80	12,13	335	§ 31	VI (§§ 39-44)

[i] OHF: *Ontology--The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U.P., 1999)

[ii] CT1: *The Concept of Time* (Lecture July, 1924). Page numbers refer to the KK edition.

[iii] CT2: "The Concept of Time" (Projected article November, 1924) Paraphrased and summarized in GBT. Page numbers refer to GBT

[iv] HCT: *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U.P., 1985)

[v] BT: *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962)

[vi] Chapter IV ("A More Original Explication of In-Being: The Being of Dasein as Care") in HCT will be split into two by grouping HCT's §§27-30 into BT's Chapter IV ("Being-in as Such") and HCT's §31 into BT's Chapter V ("Care as the Being of Dasein").